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Abstract
Augustin Cournot, an unsung pioneer of many economic ideas during his time, who has
written the book, Theory of Wealth, where he developed many economic ideas including the
oligopoly theory, doupoly model, the ideas of function and probability into economic analysis.
This paper discusses the way he thought the economics should be analyzed as well as his life
cycle.
Introduction
Antoine Augustin Cournot (28 August 1801 – 31 March 1877) was a French philosopher and
mathematician who also has great contribution to the development of economic theory [4].
His theories on monopolies and duopolies are still famous in economics. In 1838 the book
Researches on the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth was published, in which he
used the applications of the formulas and symbols of mathematics in economic analysis. This
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book was highly criticized and not very successful during Cournot’s lifetime, and he did try to
rewrite it twice, but it still has influence in economics today. Today many economists believe
this book to be the point of departure for modern economic analysis. Cournot introduced
the ideas of functions and probability into economic analysis. He derived the first formula for
the rule of supply and demand as a function of price and in fact was the first to draw supply
and demand curves on a graph, anticipating the work of Alfred Marshall by roughly thirty
years. The Cournot duopoly model developed in his book also introduced the concept of a
(pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, the Reaction function and best-response dynamics. Cournot
believed that economists must utilize the tools of mathematics only to establish probable
limits and to express less stable facts in more absolute terms. He further held that the practical
uses of mathematics in economics do not necessarily involve strict numerical precision. Today,
Cournot’s work is recognized in econometrics. He was also a teacher of political economy and
mathematics to Auguste Walras, who was the father of Léon Walras. Cournot and Auguste
Walras persuaded Léon Walras to try political economics. Cournot is also credited to be one
of the sources of inspiration for Léon Walras and his equilibrium theory. By the time Cournot
died in 1877, he was nearly blind. In the field of economics he is best known for his work in the
field of oligopoly theory—Cournot competition which is named after him.
Cournot’s life and his contribution
Of Franche-Comté peasant stock, Cournot’s family had belonged for two generations to the
petite bourgeoisie of Gray. In his Souvenirs he says very little about his parents but a great
deal about his paternal uncle, a notary to whom he apparently owed his early education [5].
Cournot was deeply impressed by the conflict that divided the society in which he lived into
the adherents of the ancien régime and the supporters of new ideas, especially in the realm of
religion. One of his uncles was a conformist priest, the other a faithful disciple of the Jesuits,
having been educated by them.
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Between 1809 and 1816 Cournot received his secondary education at the collège of Gray
and showed a precocious interest in politics by attending the meetings of a small royalist club.
He spent the next four years idling away his time, working “en amateur” in a lawyer’s office.
Influenced by reading Laplace’s Système du monde and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence,
he became interested in mathematics and decided to enroll at the École Normale Supérieure
in Paris. In preparation, he attended a course in special mathematics at the Collège Royal in
Besançon (1820–1821) and was admitted to the École Normale after competitive examinations
in August 1821. However, on 6 September 1822 the abbé Frayssinous, newly appointed grand
master of the University of France, closed the École Normale. Cournot found himself without a
school and with only a modest allowance for twenty months. He remained in Paris, using this
free time which he called the happiest of his life to prepare at the Sorbonne for the licence in
mathematics (1822–1823). His teachers at the Sorbonne were Lacroix, a disciple of Condorcet,
and Hachette, a former colleague of Monge. A fellow student and friend was Dirichlet.
In October 1823, Cournot was hired by Marshal Gouvion-Saint-Cyr as tutor for his small
son. Soon Cournot became his secretary and collaborator in the editing and publishing of his
Mémoires Thus, for seven years, until the death of the marshal, Cournot had the opportunity
to meet the many important persons around the marshal and to reflect on matters of history
and politics. Nevertheless, Cournot was still interested in mathematics. He published eight
papers in the baron de Férussac’s Bulletin des sciences, and in 1829 he defended his thesis for
the doctorate in science, “Le mouvement d’un corps rigide soutenu par un plan fixe.” The pa-
pers attracted the attention of Poisson, who at that time headed the teaching of mathematics
in France. When, in the summer of 1833, Cournot left the service of the Gouvion-Saint-Cyr
family, Poisson immediately secured him a temporary position with the Academy of Paris. In
October 1834 the Faculty of Sciences in Lyons created a chair of analysis, and Poisson saw to it
that Cournot was appointed to this post. In between, Cournot translated and adapted John Her-
schel’s Treatise on Astronomy and Kater and Lardner’s A Treatise on Mechanics, both published,
with success, in 1834.
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From then on, Cournot was a high official of the French university system. He taught in
Lyons for a year. In October 1835 he accepted the post of rector at Grenoble, with a professor-
ship in mathematics at the Faculty of Sciences. Subsequently he was appointed acting inspector
general of public education. In September 1838, Cournot married and left Grenoble to become
inspector general. In 1839 he was appointed chairman of the Jury d’Agrégation in mathematics,
an office he held until 1853. He left the post of inspector general to become rector at Dijon in
1854, after the Fortoul reform, and served there until his retirement in 1862.
Cournot produces several mathematical, statistical, philosophical as well as economical
work through out his life. He also translated some English mathematical books, including Sir
John Herschel’s Astronomy, and edited in two volumes Euler’s celebrated Letters to a Princess,
etc. For nearly forty years the Principes mathematiques was completely ignored by economists.
Unassuming and shy, Cournot was considered an exemplary civil servant by his contem-
poraries. His religious opinions seem to have been very conservative. In politics he was an
enthusiastic royalist in 1815, only to be disappointed by the restoration of the monarchy. In the
presidential elections following the 1848 Revolution, he voted for Louis Eugène Cavaignac, a
moderate republican. In 1851, sharply disapproving the organization of public instruction as
directed by Louis Napoleon, he decided to become a candidate in the legislative elections in
Haute-Saône; this election, however, was prevented by the coup d’état of 2 December.
Cournot’s background and his education made him a member of the provincial petite bour-
geoisie of the ancien régime. But as a civil servant of the July monarchy and the Second Em-
pire, he became integrated into the new bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century. Of certainly
mediocre talents as far as pure mathematics was concerned, he left behind work on the phi-
losophy of science, remarkably forceful and original for its period, that foreshadowed the ap-
plication of mathematics to the sciences of mankind. Nobody could express better and more
humorously Cournot’s importance than he himself when he reported Poisson’s appreciation of
his first works: “He [Poisson] discovered in them a philosophical depth—and, I must honestly
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say, he was not altogether wrong. Furthermore, from them he predicted that I would go far in
the field of pure mathematical speculation but (as I have always thought and have never hesi-
tated to say) in this he was wrong”.
Cournot’s mathematical work amounts to very little: some papers on mechanics without
much originality, the draft of his course on analysis, and an essay on the relationship between
algebra and geometry. Thus, it is mainly the precise idea of a possible application of mathemat-
ics to as yet unexplored fields that constitutes his claim to fame. With the publication in 1838
of his Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des rishesses he was a third of
a century ahead of Walras and Jevons and must be considered the true founder of mathemati-
cal economics. By reducing the problem of price formation in a given market to a question of
analysis, he was the first to formulate the data of the diagram of monopolistic competition, thus
defining a type of solution that has remained famous as “Cournot’s point.” Since then, his argu-
ments have of course been criticized and amended within a new perspective. Undoubtedly, he
remains the first of the important pioneers in this field.
Cournot’s work on the “theory of chance occurrences” contains no mathematical innova-
tion. Nevertheless, it is important in the history of the calculus of probability, since it examines
in an original way the interpretation and foundations of this calculus and its applications. Ac-
cording to Cournot, occurrences in our world are always determined by a cause. But in the
universe there are independent causal chains. If at a given point in time and space, two of these
chains have a common link, this coincidence constitutes the fortuitous character of the event
thus engendered. Consequently, there would be an objective chance occurrence that would
nevertheless have a cause. This seeming paradox would be no reflection of our ignorance.
This objective chance occurrence is assigned a certain value in a case where it is possible
to enumerate—for a given event—all the possible combinations of circumstances and all those
in which the event occurs. This value is to be interpreted as a degree of “physical possibility.”
However, one must distinguish between a physical possibility that differs from 0 (or 1)only by
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an infinitely small amount and a strict logical impossibility (or necessity).
On the other hand, Cournot also insisted on the necessary distinction between this physi-
cal possibility, or “objective probability,” and the “subjective probability” that depends on our
ignorance and rests on the consideration of events that are deemed equiprobable1 since there
is not sufficient cause to decide otherwise. Blaise Pascal, Fermat, Huygens, and Leibniz would
have seen only this aspect of probability. Jakob I Bernoulli, despite his ambiguous vocabulary,
would have been the first to deal with objective probabilities that Cournot was easily able to
estimate on the basis of frequencies within a sufficiently large number of series of events.
To these two ideas of probability Cournot added a third that he defined as “philosophical
probability.” This is the degree of rational, not measurable, belief that we accord a given scien-
tific hypothesis. It “depends mainly upon the idea that we have of the simplicity of the laws
of nature, of order, and of the rational succession of phenomena”. Of course, Cournot nei-
ther solved nor even satisfactorily stated the problem of the logical foundation of the calculus
of probability. But he had the distinction of having been the first to dissociate—in a radical
way—various ideas that still were obscure, thus opening the way for deeper and more system-
atic research by more exact mathematicians. He also was able to show clearly the importance
of the applications of the calculus of probability to the scientific description and explanation
of human acts. He himself—following Condorcet and Poisson—attempted to interpret legal
statistics. But he also warned against premature and abusive applications” that might discredit
this ambitious project.
More than for his mathematical originality, Cournot is known for his views on scientific
knowledge. He defined science as logically organized knowledge, comprising both a classifi-
cation of the objects with which it deals and an ordered concatenation of the propositions it
sets forth. It claims neither the eternal nor the absolute: “There can be nothing more incon-
sistent than the degree of generality of the data with which the sciences deal—data susceptible
to the degree of order and the classification that constitute scientific perfection”. Therefore, the
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fundamental characteristic of the scientific object must be defined differently. “What strikes
us first of all, what we understand best, is the form,” Cournot wrote at the beginning of the
Traite de l’enchaînement des idées, adding, scientifically we shall always know only the form
and the order.” Thus, it was from this perspective that he interpreted scientific explanation and
stressed the privilege of mathematics—the science of form par excellence. Even though estab-
lishing himself as forerunner of a completely modern structural concept of the scientific object,
Cournot did not go so far as to propose a reduction of the process of knowledge to the appli-
cation of logical rules. On the contrary, he insisted upon the domination of strictly formal and
demonstrative logic by “another logic, much more fruitful, a logic which separates appearance
from reality, a logic which connects specific observations and infers general laws from them, a
logic which ranks truth and fact”.
Book: Researches on theMathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth
A distinguished scholar, a skillful writer, endowed with an original and lofty intellect,
Cournot was a master in the art of education. According to Reghinos D. Theocharis [6] the
long and slow road of Cournot’s Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie des
Richesses towards recognition of its value for economic theory. Until the appearance of the
second edition of W.S. Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy, Cournot, when not ignored, was
generally the object of adverse and even derisory criticism; but we also find solitary and ap-
preciative comments on aspects of his work, including those by Leon Walras, whose key role in
establishing the importance of the Recherches is stressed. Mr. Walras does himself credit by
being his disciple. " Mr. Cournot," he says, " is the first person to have seriously attempted the
application of mathematics to political economy". It is also pointed out that this process was
particularly slow in the English-speaking world.
C. Esmenard du Mazet, who in a book published in 1849 attempted some appli- cations of
mathematics to economic theory and gave some formulas in introducing a rudimentary equa-
tion of exchange of doubtful significance, chose to refer to Cournot and his Recherches in a
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critical and definitely derisory way. Referring to what he considered the causes of price varia-
tions, Esmenard accused economists in general: ’without analysing the general phenomenon,
without ever starting from clear and distinct principles, they have built a kind of a tower of Ba-
bel, they have lost themselves in the confusion of expressions, in which some want to retrench
by using the famous formula of supply and demand. A fine formula indeed! From which it is
radically impossible to draw any serious inferences, but people fortu- itously put it forward so
as not to be left behind.’ And Cournot’s Recherches was the only work singled out by Esmenard
as the typical example of writings by the authors declaimed [6].
The first real appreciation of Cournot’s contribution was made in 1857 by a Canadian, J.B.
Cherriman, who was a Cambridge-trained professor of mathematics and natural philosophy
at the University of Toronto. He published an extensive review article on the Recherches, full
of praise for Cournot’s work. This review has already been cited by Goodwin and Baumol and
Goldfeld and has been extensively analysed by Dimand (1988)[6].
Coumot’s long road to recognition finally came to an end with the publication of the sec-
ond edition of Jevons’s Theory. In his preface to that edition, Jevons brought all the weight of
his authority to bear in support of the need for the long-delayed recognition of Coumot. He
described the Recherches as a work that ’must occupy a remarkable position’ in the develop-
ment of mathematical economics, and he spoke of Coumot’s ’wonderful analysis of the laws of
supply. and demand, and of the relations of prices, production, consumption, expenses and
profits’, adding that he was quite convinced that Cournot’s investigation was of ’high economic
importance, and that, when the parts of political economy to which the theory relates come to
be adequately treated, as they never have yet been, the treatment must be based upon the anal-
ysis of Cournot, or at least must follow his general method’. From then onwards, recognition of
Cournot becomes more widespread. In the years that follow, his analysis was utilized further or
commented upon by many authors, including A. Marshall, who appears to have read Coumot
as early as 1868. Finally in 1897 an English translation of the Recherches was published [6].
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Cournotmodel of Monopoly
Not surprisingly, Cournot’s work is one of the classics of game theory; it is also one of the
cornerstones of the theory of industrial organization. Cournot describes his model of monopoly
in his book, Researches on the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, as follows [2]:
suppose that a man finds himself proprietor of a mineral spring which has just been found to
possess salutary properties possessed by no other. He could doubtless fix the price of a liter of
this water at 100 francs; bu he would soon see by the scant demand, that this is not the way to
make the most of his property. He will therefore successively reduce the price of the liter to the
point which will give him the greatest possible profit; i.e. if F (p) denotes the law of demand,
he will end, after various trials, by adopting the value of p which renders the product pF (p) a
maximum, or which is determined by the equation
F (p)+pF ′(p)= 0 (1)
The product
pF (p)=
[
F (p)
]2
−F ′(p
will be the annual revenue of the owner of the spring, and this revenue will only depend on
the nature of function F .
To make equation (1) applicable, it must be supposed that for the value of p obtained from
it, there will be a corresponding value of D which the owner of the spring can deliver, or which
does not exceed the annual flow of this spring; otherwise the owner could not, without damage
to himself, reduce the price per liter as low as would be for his interest where the spring more
abundant. I the spring produces annually a number of liters expressed by ∆, by deducing p
from the relation F (p)=∆, we necessarily obtain the price per liter which must finally be fixed
by the competition of customers.
Then Cournot discussed another monopoly game in his book as, let suppose that of a man
10
who possesses the secret of a medical preparation or an artificial mineral water, for which the
material and labor must paid for. It will no longer be the function pF (p), or the annual gross
receipts, which the producer should strive to carry to its maximum value, bu the net receipts,
or the function pF (p)−φ(D), in which φ(D) denotes the cost of making a number of liters
equal to D . Since D is connected with p by the relation D+F (p), the complex function pF (p)−
φ(D) can be regarded as depending implicitly, on the single variable p, although generally the
cost of production is an explicit function, not of the price of the article produced, but of the
quantity produced. Consequently the price to which the producer should bring his article will
be determined by t he equation
D+ dD
dp
[
p− d
[
φ(D)
]
dD
]
(2)
This price will fix in turn the annual net receipts or the revenue of the inventor, and the
capital value of his secret, or his productive property, the ownership of which is guaranteed
by law and can have commercial circulation as well as that of a piece of land or any material
property. If this values is nil or insignificant, the owner of the property will obtain no pecuniary
profit from it; he will abandon it gratis, or for a very small payment, to the first comer who seek
to develop it. The value of a liter will only represent the value of the raw materials, the wages
or profits of the agents who cooperate in making and and marketing it, and the interest on the
capital necessary for development. The terms for our example prevent our admitting in this
case a limitation of the productive forces, which would hinder the producer from lowering the
price to th rate which would give the maximum net receipts, according to the law of demand.
But in a great many other case there may be such limitation, and if ∆, expresses the limit which
the production or the demand cannot exceed, the price will be fixed by th relation F (p)=∆, as
if there were no cost of production. The cost, in this case, is not borne by the consumers at all;
it only diminishes the income of the producer. It fall not exactly on the proprietor ( who, unless
the inventor or first holder,- a question of original conditions with which theory has nothing
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to do,- acquired the property, himself or through his agents, for a value proportioned to its
revenue), but on the property itself. A decrease of this cost will only be to the advantage of he
producer, so far as it does not result in the possibility of increasing his producing power.
Cournot describes that let us return to the case where where this possibility exists, and
where the price p is determined according to equation (2). We shall observe that the coefficient
d[φ(D)]
dD , though it may increase or decrease as D increases, must be supposed to be positive,
for it would be absurd that absolute expense of production should decrease as production in-
creases. We shall call attention also to the fact that necessarily p > d[φ(D)]dD , for dD being the
increase of production, d
[
φ(D)
]
is the increase in the cost, pDD is the increase of the gross
receipts, the producer will always stop when the increase in expenses exceeds the increase in
receipts. This is also abundant evident from the form of equation (2), since D is always a pos-
itive quantity, and dDdp a negative quantity. In the course of our investigations we shall seldom
have occasion to consider φ(D) directly, but only its differential coefficient
d[φ(D)]
dD , which we
will denote by φ′(D). This differential coefficient is a new function of D , the form of which ex-
erts very great influence on the principal problems of economic science. The function φ′(D)
is capable of increasing or decreasing as D increases, according to the nature of the produc-
ing forces and of the articles produced. For what are properly called manufactured articles, it is
generally the case that the cost becomes proportionally less as production increases, or, in other
words, when D increases φ′(D) is decreasing function. This comes from better organization of
the work, form discounts on the price of raw materials for large purchases, and finally from the
reduction of what is known to producers as general expense. It may happen, however, even in
exploiting products of this nature, that when the exploitation is carried beyond certain limits,
it induces higher prices for raw materials and labor, to the point where φ′(D) again begins to
increases with D . Whenever it is a question of working agricultural lands, of mines, or of quar-
ries, i.e. of what is essentially real estate, the function φ′(D) increases with D ; and as we shall
soon see, it is consequence of this fact alone that farms, mines, and quarries yield a net revenue
to their owners, long before all has been extracted from the soil which it is physically able to
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produce, and notwithstanding the great subdivision of these properties, which causes between
producers a competition which can be considered as unlimited. On the contrary, investments
made under the condition that as D increases φ′(D) decreases, can only yield a net income or
a rent in the case of a monopoly properly so-called, or of a competition sufficiently limited to
allow the effects of a monopoly collectively maintained to be still perceptible.
Then he describes between the two case where the function φ′(D) increasing and decreas-
ing, there falls naturally the one where this function reduces to a constant, the cost being con-
stantly proportional to the production, and where equation (2) takes the form
D+ dD
dp
(p− g )= 0
The case must also be pointed out where φ(D) is a constant, and φ′(D)= 0, so that the price
is the same as if there were no cost. This case occurs more frequently than would be suspected
at fist glace, especially where we have to do with production under a monopoly, and where the
value of the number D receives the extension of which it admits. For instance, in a theatrical
enterprise D denotes the number of tickets sold, and the cost of the enterprise remains practi-
cally the same, without reference to the number of spectators. for the tills of a bridge, which is
another monopolistic investment, D denotes the number passengers; and the cost for repairs,
watching, and bookkeeping will be the same, whether the crossing is much or little used. In
such cases the constant g disappears, equation (2) be comes the same as equation (1), and the
price p is determined in the same manner as if there were no costs.
Cournot describes it seems a matter of course that when the cost of production increases,
the price fixed by the monopolist, according to equation (2), will increase likewise; but, on con-
sideration, it will appear that so important a proposition should be supported by a rational
demonstration; and furthermore, this demonstration will lead us to an equally important ob-
servation, which only mathematics can incontestably establish.
Let p0 be the root of equation (2) which we will put in the form
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F (p)+F ′(p)[p−ψ(p)]= 0, (3)
asφ′(D)=φ′ [F (p)] can be more simply replaced byψ(p); and suppose that, as the function
ψ(p) varies by a quantity u, and becomes ψ(p)+u, p becomes p0+δ. If we neglect the squares
and higher powers of the increments u and δ, equation (3) will establish the following relation
between these two increments:
{
F ′(p0)
[
2−ψ′(p0)
]+F ′′(p0)[p0−ψ(p0)]}δ−uF ′(p0)= 0; (4)
The coefficient of δ in this expression being the derivative with respect to p of th fist member
of equation (3), in which derivative the values p0 has been given to p.
But this coefficient of δ is necessarily negative, according to the well-known theory of max-
ima and minima; for if it were positive, the root p0 of equation (3) would correspond to the
minimum of the function pF (p)−φ(D), and not to the maximum of his function, as it should.
Moreover F (p) is by its nature a negative quantity. In general, therefore, the increment δ is of
the same sign as the increment u.
This result has been demonstrated on the supposition that the variation u, δ are very small
quantities, of which the squares and products can be neglected without sensible error, but by
a very simple argument this restriction can be removed. In fact, whatever the increase of cost
denoted by u, it can be supposed that that the function ψ(p) passes from the value ψ(p) to
the value ψ(p)+u by a series of very small increments, u1,u2,u3, etc., all of the same sign. At
the same time p will pass from the value p0 to the value p0 +δ by a series of corresponding
increments, also very small, δ1,δ2,δ3, etc.; δ1 will be (according to the preceding paragraph) of
the same as u1,δ2 as u2, etc.
Therefore,
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δ= δ1+δ2+δ3+etc.,
will be of the same sign as
u = u1+u2+u3+etc.
This method of demonstration should be borne in mind, as it will be frequently recurred to.
From equation 4) we obtain
δ
u
= F
′(p0){
F ′(p0)
[
2−ψ′(p0)
]+F ′′(p0)[p0−ψ(p0)]}
and since both terms of the fraction in the second number are negative, we conclude that δ
will be numerically greater or less than u accordingly as we have
−F ′(p0)>−
{
F ′(p0)
[
2−ψ′(p0)
]+F ′′(p0)[p0−ψ(p0)]}
or
−F ′(p0)<−
{
F ′(p0)
[
2−ψ′(p0)
]+F ′′(p0)[p0−ψ(p0)]}
or in other words,
F ′(p0)
{
F ′(p0)
[
1−ψ′(p0)
]+F ′′(p0)[p0−ψ(p0)]}> 0
or
F ′(p0)
{
F ′(p0)
[
1−ψ′(p0)
]+F ′′(p0)[p0−ψ(p0)]}< 0
which, by replacing p0−ψ(p0) by its value as deduced from equation (3), becomes
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[
F ′(p0)
][
1−ψ′(p0)
]−F (p0)F ′′(p0)< 0
or
[
F ′(p0)
][
1−ψ′(p0)
]−F (p0)F ′′(p0)> 0.
To make this more obvious by numerical applications, let us take a fictitious case. Suppose
that function φ′(D) were at first=0, and that it subsequently reduces to a constant g . The first
value of p or p0 will be given by the equation
F (p)+pF ′(p)= 0;
the second value of p, which we will call p ′, will be given by another equation
F (p)+ (p− g )F ′(p)= 0 (5)
Suppose, in the first place, that F (p) = a
b+p2 ; the values of p0 and p
′, according ot the
preceding equations, will be respectively
p0 =
p
b, and p ′ = g +√b+ g 2 = g +√p20+ g 20
(the root of equation (5) which would give a negative value of p ′ is greater than p0 by a
quantity greater than g , i.e. greater than the amount of the new cost imposed on the produc-
tion. If, for instance, the new cost is one-tenth of the original price, or if g = 110p0, we shall have
p ′ = 1.1488p0; the increase in price will be very nearly one and one-half tenths; the old price
being 20 francs and the cost 2 francs; the new price will be 23 francs, or more exactly, 22 francs
97 centimes.
Suppose, in the second place, F (p) = 1
b+p3 , we shall have p0 =
3
√
b
2 ; and equation (5) will
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become
2p3−3gp2−b = 0
or
2p3− 3
2
gp2−p30 = 0
which be th ordinary method of solution will give
p ′ = 1
2
{
g + 3
√
g 3+4p30+2
√
2p30(g
3+2p30+
3
√
g 2+4p30+2
√
2p30(g
3+2p30+
}
In this case the excess of p ′ over p0 will be less than g .
If g = 110p0, we shall have p ′ = 1.0505p0. Thus if the new cost is one-tenth of the original
price, the increase in price will only be one-half of one-tenth of that price. The old price being
20 francs, and the added cost 2 francs, the new price will be only 21 francs, or, more exactly 21
francs .01 centime.
Then result which we have just reached is well worth attention: it shows us that, according
to the form of the function F (p), or according to the law of demand, and increase in the cost of
production augments the price of a commodity, for which there exists a monopoly, sometimes
much more and sometimes much less than the increase in cost; and that, in the same manner,
there is no equality between the reduction of cost and fall in the price of the commodity.
It results from this, that if the new cost were not met by the produced himself, but by hte
consumer, or by an intermediate agent, who would be reimbursed by the consumer, this in-
crease in cost, which would always make the article dearer for the consumer, and which would
always diminish the net income of the producer, might, according to circumstances, produce
and advance or a decline in the price paid to the producer.
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Reciprocally, a fall in he cost of transmission, or in that of passing the commodity from
the possession of the produced to that of the consumer, may have the effect at one time of
increasing the price paid to that producer, and at another time of diminishing it; but in all case
it will diminish the final price paid by the consumer, and will cause an increase n the net income
of the producer.
All those expenses which are incurred with a view to preparing for final consumption an
crude commodity as it leaves the producers’ hands, must in this respect be considered in the
same light as costs of transmission.
However, this calculation is only applicable in the case where the producer can meet the
demand which gives him the greatest net return, and reduce his price as much as is necessary
to attain this maximum return. In other cases, he will produce all he can, before as well as after
the change in the cost, whether of production or of transmission, and the cost price to the con-
sumer will remain invariable, because in a condition of equilibrium, and on a large scale, there
cannot be two different prices for the same quantity marketed. The increase of cost, therefore,
from whatever source, must finally be wholly borne by the producer.
Cournotmodel of Duopoly
We consider a very simple version of Cournot’s model here. Illustration of the model [7]
(a) the translation of an informal statement of a problem into a normal-form representation
of a game; (b). The computations involved in solving for the game’s Nash equilibrium; and (c)
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Let q1 and q2 denote the quantities (of a homogeneous product) produced by firms 1 and
2, respectively. Let P (Q) = a−Q be the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on
the market is Q = q1+ qz. (More precisely, P (Q) = a −Q for Q < a, and P (Q) = 0 for Q > a.)
Assume that the total cost to firm i of producing quantity qi ; is Ci (qi ) = cqi . That is, there
are no fixed costs and the marginal cost is constant at c, where we assume c < a. Following
Cournot, suppose that the firms choose their quantities simultaneously. In order to find the
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Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game, we first translate the problem into a normal-form game.
(1) the players in the game, (2) the strategies available to each player, and (3) the payoff received
by each player for each combination of strategies that could be chosen by the players. There are
of course two players in any duopoly game-the two firms. In the Cournot model, the strategies
available to each firm are the different quantities it might produce. We will assume that output
is continuously divisible. Naturally, negative outputs are not feasible. Thus, each firm’s strategy
space can be represented as Si = [0,∞), the non-negative real numbers, in which case a typical
strategy si ; is a quantity choice, qi > 0. One could argue that extremely large quantities are not
feasible and so should not be included in a firm’s strategy space. Because P (Q) = 0 for Q > a,
however, neither firm will produce a quantity qi > a. It remains to specify the payoff to firm i
as a function of the strategies chosen by it and by the other firm, and to define and solve for
equilibrium. We assume that the firm’s payoff is simply its profit. Thus, the payoff ui (si , s j ) in a
general two-player game in normal form can be written here as
pii (qi ,q j )= qi [P (qi +q j )− c]= qi [a− (qi +q j )− c].
In a two-player game in normal form, the strategy pair (s?i , s
?
j ) is a Nash equilibrium if, for
each player i ,
ui (si , s j )≥ ui (si , s j )
for every feasible strategy si in Si . Equivalently, for each player i , s?i must solve the opti-
mization problem.
max
(si )∈Si
ui (si , s
?
j )
In the Cournot duopoly model, the analogous statement is that the quantity pair (q j ,qi ) is a
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Nash equilibrium if, for each firm i , qi solves
max
(0≤qi<∞)
pii
(
qi ,q
?
j
)
= max
(0≤qi<∞)
qi
[
a−
(
qi +q?j
)
− c
]
Assuming q?j < a− c (as will be shown to be true), the first-order condition for firm i ′s opti-
mization problem is both necessary and sufficient; it yields
qi = 1
2
(
a−q?j − c
)
(6)
Thus, if the quantity pair (qi ,q j ) is to be a Nash equilibrium, the firms’ quantity choices
must satisfy
q?1 =
1
2
(a−q?2 − c)
q?2 =
1
2
(a−q?1 − c)
Solving this pair of equations yields
q?1 = q?2 =
a− c
3
which is indeed less than a− c, as assumed. The intuition behind this equilibrium is sim-
ple. Each firm would of course like to be a monopolist in this market, in which case it would
choose qi to maximize pii (qi ,0)-it would produce the monopoly quantity qm = (a − c)/2 and
earn the monopoly profit pii
(
qm ,0
) = (a−c)24 . Given that there are two firms, aggregate profits
for the duopoly would be maximized by setting the aggregate quantity q1+ q2 equal to the
monopoly quantity qm , as would occur if qi = qm2 for each i , for example. The problem with
this arrangement is that each firm has an incentive to deviate: because the monopoly quan-
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tity is low, the associated price P (qm) is high, and at this price each firm would like to increase
its quantity, in spite of the fact that such an increase in production drives down the market-
clearing price. (To see this formally, use (6) to check that qm2 is not firm 2’s best response to
the choice of qm2 by firm 1.) In the Cournot equilibrium, in contrast, the aggregate quantity is
higher, so the associated price is lower, so the temptation to increase output is reduced-reduced
by just enough that each firm is just deterred from increasing its output by the realization that
the market-clearing price will fall.
Rather than solving for the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot game algebraically, one could
instead proceed graphically, as follows. Equation (6) gives firm i’s best response to firm j’s equi-
librium strategy, q j . Analogous reasoning leads to firm 2’s best response to an arbitrary strategy
by firm 1 and firm 1’s best response to an arbitrary strategy by firm 2. Assuming that firm l’s
strategy satisfies q1 < a − c, firm 2’s best response is likewise, if q2 < a − c then firm 1’s best
response is
Figure 1
R2
(
q1
)= 1
2
(
a−q1− c
)
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likewise, if q2 < a− c then firm 1’s best response is
R1
(
q2
)= 1
2
(
a−q2− c
)
As shown in Figure 1, these two best-response functions intersect only once, at the equilib-
rium quantity (qi ,q j )·
Cournotmodel of Oligopoly
Suppose there are n firms in the Cournot oligopoly model. Let qi denote the quantity pro-
duced by firm i , and Iet Q = q1+, . . .+ qn denote the aggregate quantity on the market. Let
P denote the market-clearing price and assume that inverse demand is given by P (Q) = a−Q
(assuming Q < a, else P = 0). Assume that the total cost of firm i from producing quantity qi is
Ci
(
qi
)= cqi . That is, there are no fixed costs and the marginal cost is constant at c, where we as-
sume c < a. Following Cournot, suppose that the firms choose their quantities simultaneously.
According to the above explanation profit of firm i is given by
pii =pii
(
q1,q2, . . .qN
)= [P (Q)− c]qi
First order condition:
∂pi
∂qi
= a−Q−i −2q2− c = 0 (7)
where
Qi = q1+q2+ ...+qi−1+qi+1+ . . .+qN
Equation (7) implies
q?i
(
Q?−i
)= a−Q?−i − c
2
(8)
Since function (8) is symmetric, we can write
q?1 = q?2 = q?3 = . . .= q?N
22
which implies
Q−i = (N −1)q?i (9)
plugging (9) into (8) we get
q?i
(
Q?−i
)= a− (N −1)q?i − c
2
= q?i
which implies
q?i =
a− c
N +1
which is the Nash equilibrium.
Hence
Q? = N
N +1(a− c)
pi= (a− c)
2
(N +1)2
P?
(
Q?
)= a− N
N +1(a− c)
Now if N ←→∞ then Q? = a− c, consequently pi? = 0, and p? = c. Therefore no profit.
Tragedies in the life of Cournot
ANDREW CARNEGIE once mentioned, "It does not pay to pioneer." Certainly, if there is
any truth in this statement, it finds ample illustration in the life and work of Antoine-Augustin
Cournot. The pioneering which he did brought him no financial reward, little academic recog-
nition, and scarcely any intellectual comradeship. Alfred Marshall in his old age received a
substantial income from royalties on his books, particularly his Principles of Economics; but
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the book of which we celebrate the hundredth anniversary of original publication brought its
author no such return. In a letter to Walras in 1873 Cournot confessed that he was very unpop-
ular with his publishers because none of his books found any considerable number of readers
until years after their first appearance [1, 8].
According to A. J. Nichol [1] the tragedies in the life of Cournot were not tragedies of stark
physical misery such as have so often attended the lives of geniuses in literature, art, and phi-
losophy. Cournot did not starve in a garret. He was not carried off by death in the springtime
of youth as were Keats, Shelley, Byron, Abel, and Galois. He was not picked up out of a gutter to
die as was Edgar Allan Poe. Economists generally do not do that sort of thing. The tragedies to
which economists are usually subject are intellectual rather than physical. They are tragedies of
the soul. So it was in the main with Cournot. Yet, as we shall see, a physical infirmity lay at the
root of many of his intellectual disappointments. In America and England Cournot is known as
an economist, but in France he is chiefly remembered as a philosopher. The article on Cournot
in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, written by one of his own countrymen, gives much
more attention to his philosophical writings than to his work in economics. So it was also in the
obituaries published in Paris after his death in 1877. published in Paris after his death in 1877.
When a movement was started in 1905 for reconsideration of his work, the results were gathered
together in no economic publication but in a philosophical journal. Among those with whom
he mingled in day-to-day routine, however, Cournot was known as an administrative official of
the French public schools. Not the least of the legacies left to France by Napoleon was its highly
centralized educational system.
A. J. Nichol [1] discussed in his article, Cournot’s friend, Poisson, died in 1840. After that
Cournot made no further spectacular progress in the service of the University. Trouble with
his eyes forced him in 1844 to take a year’s leave of absence, and this he spent in Italy. He had
experienced difficulties with vision while he was a student in the University and secretary to
Marshal Gouvion Saint- Cyr. This condition had gradually grown worse through the years. After
his return from Italy he does not seem to have been seriously handicapped in the performance
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of his regular duties as administrator and supervisor, but there was a very profound change
in the character of his published work. To Walras in 1873 he wrote, "Thirty years ago I had to
renounce all mathematics."
It became impossible for him to engage in any long-continued close work with his eyes. He
did not give up his companionship with books. Secretaries read aloud to him regularly for hours
at a time. He never found any one, however, who could read mathematics to him. Symbols, the
meaning and possibilities of which he had once grasped so masterfully through the eye, he was
never able to comprehend by ear. When Professor Irving Fisher edited the English translation
of Cournot’s Researches in the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, he found the
original French version replete with mistakes. Some of them were trivial and easily corrected;
others were fundamental errors in mathematical reasoning. Thus Cournot’s great work bore
the appearance of gross carelessness in proofreading and original composition.3 Such perhaps
there may indeed have been. Another very pertinent explanation of Cournot’s errors of 1838,
however, lies in the fact that even then he was approaching a state of partial blindness. To the
academy (school district) of Dijon Cournot came as Rector (Superintendent) in 1854, having
declined another more lucrative appointment because of political complications. He remained
at Dijon until his retirement in 1862. Then, vigorous otherwise but eyesight worse than ever,
almost Milton-like, he made his home again in Paris. A few years before retirement Cournot
completed a very illuminating volume of personal memoirs. They remained in manuscript
form, almost entirely unknown, for more than fifty years before they were published.9 These
memoirs, and the voluminous philosophical works which Cournot had printed both before and
after his retirement, were written in a very curious way. They were first jotted down piece- meal
on scraps of paper, then collected and copied by an amanuensis, read back to him, and cor-
rected. Outside of a few modest advertisements by his publisher the first printed reference to
Courniot’s work in economics came in a twenty- page review" in the Journal des fconomistes,
August, 1864. In the first few months of his retirement Cournot had written a second book in
economics. Its appearance turned the attention of the reviewer back to Cournot’s first book,
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written twenty-five years previously; and to the earlier work the review was principally devoted.
In conclusion Cournot was upbraided for lack of progress and lack of familiarity with other work
in economics. Obstinate in his independence, Cournot in the preface to his third book in eco-
nomics (published after his death) replied, saying in effect: "I am the only French economist
who has not been cited by the others. I’ll be d-d if I cite them." Fifteen years Cournot lived in
retirement on the pension of an old employee of the University. These years were tinged with
bitterness and disappointment. The news came that another young French professor, Leon
Walras, was applying to economics the same technique which Cournot himself had used. Alas,
it was a technique which had long before been renounced by its originator. As the shadows
darkened, a possibility appeared of his election to the French Academy as an economist. To
further his chances his friends urged him to write an- other book, and this he did; but death
suddenly took him away without receipt of further honor. He did not live to see his last book in
print. The supreme tragedy of Cournot’s life without doubt was the tragedy of blindness. If he
had found a good occulist, if he had been a well man, he might have advanced the progress of
mathematical economics a generation. It would not then have been left to a Marshall, a Walras,
and Irving Fisher to make his ideas known to the world. He might have done it himself.
Conclusion
It is hardly surprising that Cournot’s road to a wider recognition of the significance of his
contribution was so slow. His Recherches was a book before its time. Despite the appear-
ance of other tendencies, mainstream economics in both England and on the continent of Eu-
rope was dominated, during the nineteenth century until the 1870s, by the classical tradition.
Though not necessarily linked with this tradition, there was an aversion among most profes-
sional economists against the use of mathematics in economic analysis; any such attempt was
treated with suspicion, if not hostility. This attitude was, perhaps, partly due to the fact that few
of the academic economists of that time were able mathematicians. This was especially the case
among academic economists in continental Europe, where political economy was in most cases
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one of the subjects taught in the law schools. On the other hand, most academic economists
held the view that political economy was a branch of moral philosophy, for which the most ap-
propriate method was the literary deductive method of analysing cause and effect. Character-
istic in this respect was Caimes’s thesis that ’economic truths are not discoverable through the
instrumentality of mathematics’ (1888, iv). It should be noted in this context that authors like
Cher- riman, Fauveau, Newcomb, and Walras, who during this period had shown real appreci-
ation of Coumot’s contribution, had received formal training in theoretical and applied math-
ematics. Finally, one should not forget the language barrier, which made Cournot’s Recherche
practically inaccessible to English-speaking economists, before its trans- lation in 1897. It is in-
teresting to note that the only English-speaking authors who had made references to Cournot
in published writings before the second edition of Jevons’s Theory in 1879 were Cherriman and
Newcomb.
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